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The solvency standards implicit in bank capital levels, as reported eg in Jackson et 
al (2002), are much higher than those required for top ratings, if standard single 
period economic capital models are taken seriously. We explain this excess capital 
puzzle by forward looking rating targeting behaviour by banks, which aims at 
maintaining rating above a minimum target in future periods. We calibrate to data 
on actual bank capital the confidence level used by the median US AA rated bank 
to maintain at least a single A rating. The calibrated confidence level is in line 
with the historical probability of an AA rated bank to be downgraded below A. 
 
Key words: bank capital, credit rating, value-at-risk, economic capital, capital 
structure 
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Pankin luokitustavoite ja pääomitus 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 27/2006 
Esa Jokivuolle – Samu Peura 




Pankit ylläpitävät paljon suurempaa vakavaraisuutta kuin parhaat luottokelpoi-
suusluokitukset edellyttäisivät. Tähän johtopäätökseen tulevat Jackson et al 
(2002), kun he vertaavat yhden periodin taloudellisen pääoman mallin tuloksia 
pankkien todelliseen pääomitukseen. Tässä tutkimuksessa näytämme, että pank-
kien ylimääräiset pääomapuskurit voidaan kuitenkin selittää eteenpäin katsovalla 
mallilla, jossa pankki pyrkii säilyttämään luottokelpoisuusluokituksensa tietyllä 
vähimmäistasolla myös tulevaisuudessa. Kalibroimme mallin avulla tyypillisen 
yhdysvaltalaisen AA-luokitellun pankin käyttämän luottamustason, jolla pankki 
pyrkii säilyttämään vähintään yhden A:n luokituksen. Kalibroitu luottamustaso on 
lähellä tilastollista frekvenssiä, jolla pankin AA-luokitus putoaa A:n alapuolelle. 
 
Avainsanat: pankkien pääomitus, luottokelpoisuusluokitus, riskienhallinta, talou-
dellinen pääoma 
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Recent literature has argued that benefits associated with a sufficiently high credit 
rating have been overlooked by traditional capital structure studies (Kisgen, 
2005a, b). Such benefits include lower cost of debt capital, which could rise in a 
discrete manner as a result of a rating downgrade.
1 Kisgen (2005b) argues that 
since financial leverage is an important determinant of agency ratings companies 
may target a certain rating by managing their equity-debt ratio. Using US data on 
both non-financial and financial corporations he provides evidence that firms 
respond asymmetrically to rating changes by reducing leverage in response to 
rating downgrades, in order to regain previous rating, while doing nothing after 
rating upgrades. This effect is most pronounced around the investment 
grade/speculative grade threshold. Kisgen’s (2005b) results suggest that 
maintaining a certain minimum rating is the primary objective of rating targeting. 
  Targeting a minimum credit rating may be particularly important for financial 
institutions such as banks. In addition to the cost of debt capital, a bank’s access 
to unsecured markets such as swaps appears to be tied to maintaining a 
sufficiently high rating which according to Jackson et al (2002) would at a 
minimum be ‘single A’. Overall, Jackson et al (2002) report that the great 
majority of G10 banks, around 97% at the end of 1998, have an investment grade 
rating (BBB – or higher) which clearly indicates the preference for high ratings in 
the banking industry. Suggestive evidence that many banks target at least the A 
rating can also be drawn from Nickell et al (2000) who provide separate rating 
transition probability matrices for banks and industrials based on Moody’s data. A 
bank with a BBB rating has a significantly, both statistically and economically, 
higher probability than an industrial company of being upgraded to an A rating 
within a year (Nickell et al, 2000, table 2). This suggests that banks may take 
extra measures to restore their capital base and hence their rating after falling 
below the A grade. 
  In the banking industry, the amount of equity which is needed for a given 
rating is often called economic capital.
2 Economic capital is defined as the amount 
of book equity a bank needs to cover with a chosen confidence level unexpected 
losses, or unexpected changes in the market value of its assets, in its portfolio over 
a given time horizon. Because the chosen confidence level implies the bank’s 
solvency standard, it effectively links economic capital with the rating category 
which historically exhibits the same solvency standard. For instance, Jackson et al 
                                                 
1 Boot et al (2005) provide a theory in which ratings have a role as a coordination mechanism in 
situations where multiple equilibria may obtain. This has implications consistent with discrete 
value changes in connection with rating changes. 
2 See especially Jackson et al, 2002, and also Elizalde and Repullo, 2004, for a more general 
discussion on economic capital.  
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(2002) argue that a bank A rating would imply a 99.96% solvency standard so, 
conversely, a bank aiming at an A rating should reserve economic capital using 
the 99.96% confidence level.
3 
  Jackson et al (2002) provide evidence that Tier 1 capital holdings of the 
largest US banks imply extremely high confidence levels for economic capital 
(median 99.9977%). These clearly exceed the confidence levels needed for the top 
ratings; A – AAA. Jackson et al (2002) point to two possible explanations for this 
discrepancy. Either the economic capital model they use biases the results, or their 
calculations (using information on banks’ corporate credit portfolios only) do not 
properly account for other risk categories, such as market and operational risks, 
that rating agencies consider. 
  An alternative explanation would be that banks hold a capital buffer in excess 
of the minimum amount of economic capital needed for their minimum rating 
target. As Gordy and Howells (2004) describe, ‘an institution that seeks to have 
capital sufficient for an AA rating today (say, a one-year target solvency 
probability of 99.95%) might also want to have a 95% probability of remaining 
investment grade at the (given) horizon. This (extra) constraint creates a buffer for 
economic capital.’ The economic capital plus the buffer on top of it would then 
imply the very high confidence level in the traditional economic capital 
calculation, which Jackson et al (2002) obtained. To put it another way, banks’ 
economic capital planning that considers both current and future ratings may be a 
more dynamic problem than the standard static economic capital models suggest. 
  We argue in this paper that rating targeting behaviour could explain the high 
quality banks’ excess capital puzzle reported by Jackson et al (2002). We 
formulate the problem of a bank which wants to maintain its rating over a chosen 
horizon, when unexpected losses can occur, asset quality may deteriorate and 
when risk transfer or timely access to external capital market without excessive 
costs may not be possible. We show how to incorporate this minimum rating 
targeting problem into a value-at-risk framework routinely used by banks, and 
illustrate the approach with a hypothetical bank holding only a corporate credit 
portfolio. 
  Our approach is analogous to a bank reserving a capital buffer on top of its 
regulatory minimum capital requirement, studied by Peura and Jokivuolle (2004).
4 
They develop a simulation methodology to determine the capital buffer a bank 
would hold on top of the regulatory minimum capital requirement in order to meet 
                                                 
3 One could argue that rating targeting by the means of reserving sufficient capital against 
measured asset risks would be relatively straightforward in the case of banks. This is because 
banks’ asset risks mainly consist of financial risks, such as market and credit risks, for which 
advanced risk measurement techniques and software is available. On the other hand, Morgan 
(2002) provides evidence that rating agencies more often disagree about bank ratings than other 
corporate ratings, which arguably is a result of banks’ greater balance sheet opacity. 
4 The analogy was first discussed in Gordy and Howells (2004) which is an extended working 
paper version of Gordy and Howells (2006).  
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future minimum requirements with a chosen probability. In the rating targeting 
problem, minimum capital requirement is replaced by an economic capital target. 
Because economic capital is itself obtained from a value-at-risk calculation, the 
approach in effect involves two nested value-at-risk problems. 
  To address the puzzle of Jackson et al (2002) of excessively high capital 
levels, we calibrate the confidence level parameter with which a highly rated bank 
would prefer to maintain at least a single A rating over its planning horizon. To 
this end we use data on a representative US high quality bank’s credit portfolio, 
reported in Gordy (2000), and on large US double A banks’ Tier 1 capital ratios. 
The result of such a calibration can then be compared with evidence from banks’ 
rating transition probabilities, reported in Nickell et al (2000), which provide a 
direct indication of how often an AA rated bank would tolerate a rating 
downgrade below single A. We find these two alternative measures of the 
confidence level to be in line, which supports the view that rating targeting 
behavior may explain the high-quality banks’ excessive capital levels. 
  The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 the two-stage value-at-risk 
simulation framework is described, and section 3 presents evidence of the 
confidence level used by high-quality banks in rating targeting. Section 4 




2  A model of rating targeting 
We consider a hypothetical bank with assets consisting of corporate credits only. 
We assume that the bank wants to maintain its rating at or above a given target, 
say A, with confidence level α over its planning horizon T. The confidence level 
can be interpreted as the outcome of the bank trading off the benefits of a given 
rating against the cost of the capital required to support the rating. The horizon T 
is related to the capital market imperfections that the bank faces in adjusting its 
portfolio and capital in economic downturns. 
  We assume that rating is determined by external agencies through a 
comparison of the bank’s actual capital and its economic capital. In particular, to 
obtain its minimum rating target, the bank’s actual capital must exceed the 
economic capital associated with the confidence level implied by the minimum 
rating target (such as 99.96% over one year horizon for an A rating). Economic 
capital increases with the applied confidence level, hence better ratings necessitate 
increasing amounts of capital. 
  Bank capital dynamics is driven by bank income I and credit losses L. Given 
initial capital C0, bank capital at the planning horizon T satisfies 
CT = C0 + IT − LT. We exclude new equity issues over the planning horizon with  
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reference to capital market imperfections. We also ignore dividends since these 
would not be paid in adverse economic conditions. Denoting the economic capital 
associated with the bank’s rating target by E, we can express the bank’s rating 
targeting objective as 
 
[] α ≥ ≥ − + T T T 0 E L I C P  (2.1) 
 
The minimum initial capital satisfying condition (2.1) may then be written as 
 
[] {}
() ( ) [] {} α ≥ − + − ≥ − =
α ≥ ≥ − + =
T T 0 T 0 0 0
T T T 0 0 0
I L E E E C P : C min
E L I C P : C min C ˆ
 (2.2) 
 
The latter expression shows that the rating targeting problem reduces to the choice 
of the capital buffer to be held in excess of the current economic capital, C0 − E0. 
Moreover, this capital buffer reserves for two sources of uncertainty: 1) changes 
in economic capital over the planning horizon, and 2) bank’s net losses over the 
planning horizon. In effect, we simulate bank’s actual capital and the minimum 
capital required for a given rating, ie economic capital, simultaneously. Their joint 
dynamics determines the required capital buffer, the excess of actual over 
economic capital, which the bank needs to hold to achieve a given confidence in 
maintaining its target rating. 
  The minimization (2.2) is a value-at-risk problem which would reduce to a 
standard value-at-risk problem if we ignored the economic capital constraint. 
Including economic capital makes the problem a nested value-at-risk problem 
because ET is itself a result of a value-at-risk calculation; hence our model could 
be termed ‘VaR on VaR’. 
  The uncertainty in our model stems from rating migration in the bank’s credit 
portfolio. Rating transitions and defaults over the planning horizon determine 
portfolio rating distribution and credit losses at T. Portfolio rating distribution in 
turn determines economic capital at T. 
  We apply the standard one-factor version of the CreditMetrics methodology 
(J. P. Morgan, 1997), used in numerous studies (see eg Gordy, 2000, Jackson et 
al, 2002, and Peura and Jokivuolle, 2004), for generating correlated rating 
transitions and defaults over the horizon T. This is implemented through a single 
period Monte Carlo simulation. To avoid simulation on simulation, we use an 
analytic approximation for calculating economic capital at T. Our approximation 
is the Basel II IRBA function (Basel Committee, 2004) which is based on the 
same fundamentals as the CreditMetrics methodology (see Gordy, 2003). We 
adjust the confidence level in the IRBA function away from the Basel II value 
(99.9%) and remove the ad hoc smoothing added by the Basel Committee and 
implemented through the correlation function. We keep the maturity adjustment in  
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the formula to account for maturity sensitivity of economic capital.
5 Based on the 
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to be applied both at time 0 and at time T, where the maturity adjustment, Mi, is 
given by 
 
b 5 . 1 1







mi is maturity in years, b = [0.11852 − 0.05478 ln(PD)]
1/2 (see Basel Committee, 
2004),
6 K is the number of credit assets in the bank’s portfolio and Di is an 
indicator function of default for obligor i. EADi and LGDi are the exposure and 
the percentage loss given default, N is the standard normal distribution function, 
N
−1 is its inverse function, PDi is the probability of default and ρi is the correlation 
of the obligor’s asset value with the systematic factor. The confidence level β 
depends on the rating target. 
  Bank income accrues from loan portfolio entirely, the income from each loan 
being a fixed multiple θ of the expected loss rate on that loan. The credit loss from 
a defaulted asset, on the other hand, is deterministic LGD percent times the 
exposure at default. We hence obtain the following expression for net loss over 




θ − − = −
K
1 i
i i i T , i i i
K
1 i
T , i T T EAD LGD PD ) D 1 ( EAD LGD D I L  (2.4) 
 
where PDs are time zero unconditional PDs. 
 
 
                                                 
5 The IRBA model in effect provides a measure of economic capital which is based only on losses 
incurred by defaults. It is not a mark-to-market based economic capital model used eg in Jackson 
et al (2002). Nonetheless, we do not know exactly how much credit rating agencies weight 
potential losses from defaults on the one hand and losses in market value of bank credits on the 
other hand in their assessments of banks’ solvency. Therefore, it may well be that our IRBA based 
economic capital model in default mode was well in line with agency rating criteria, especially 
around year 2000 which we use in our calibration of α; see the next section. 
6 Note that for mi = 1 the maturity adjustment equals one.  
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3  The rating targeting confidence level implicit in 
bank capital 
Here we calibrate the confidence level α associated with rating targeting by 
matching model capital with equity capital actually held by highly rated US 
banks. We use data on a representative US high quality corporate credit portfolio 
allegedly held by such banks. We then contrast the calibrated value with a more 
direct measure of the confidence level. 
  The confidence level α with which a bank wants to maintain its minimum 
rating target can be interpreted as a result of the bank’s capital structure 
optimization problem in which the bank’s credit rating is a factor. The higher the 
confidence level, the more the bank values the benefits associated with a 
sufficiently high rating vis-à-vis the cost of additional equity, given the risk level 
of its assets. The value of α is likely to vary across banks and perhaps also across 
time, and it may depend on the specific rating target a bank has as well as on the 
relative easiness and cost-effectiveness with which a bank can adjust its economic 
capital over time. Nonetheless, we find it interesting to estimate the value of α 
that, say, AA rated banks typically use. 
 We  calibrate  α by equating capital generated by our model with the median 
capital held by a sample of banks. An alternative way to assess the average value 
of  α is to look at the historical rating transition probabilities for banks. For 
instance, if a bank initially has an AA rating, the historical probability that its 
rating is in a year’s time downgraded to less than a single A rating gives an 
indication of the confidence level with which an AA bank wants to stay at least 
single A. As our approach in this paper suggests, if a bank knows and can 
measure its asset risks, it should be able to build capital buffers in advance so that 
a rating downgrade below a certain threshold rating occurs only with its chosen 
probability. By comparing the average value of α calibrated to banks’ actual 
capital buffers with banks’ rating transition probabilities reported in the previous 
literature (in particular Nickell et al, 2000) we may also be in a stronger position 
to suggest that banks’ minimum rating targeting behaviour is a potential 
explanation to the excess capital puzzle reported in Jackson et al (2002). 
 In  calibrating  α to banks’ actual capital we focus on the highest rated banks 
which are likely to be the most sensitive ones about maintaining a sufficiently 
high minimum rating. Jackson et al (2002) argue that banks that are active in 
various unsecured credit markets, such as serving as major counterparties in 
swaps trading, target at the minimum a single A rating. Moreover, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a major swap dealer bank in normal times is required to 
have an AA rating. We therefore assume that the model bank initially has an AA 
rating and wants to maintain at least a single A rating over a year’s horizon. The 
planning horizon T in our model is therefore set at one year, which appears a  
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fairly standard assumption of bank practice, and the confidence level β in the 
economic capital model (2.3) is set at 99.96%, following Jackson et al (2002). 
  Detailed information on banks’ credit portfolios is scarce. To our knowledge, 
the primary source of information used in similar studies are the representative US 
bank corporate credit portfolio rating distributions reported in Gordy (2000). 
Based on a survey conducted by the Federal Reserve Board he presents rating 
distributions for an average quality and a high quality US bank. We follow 
Jackson et al (2002) who argue that the largest US banks are most likely to hold 
the high quality credit portfolio. Therefore we focus especially on the AA rated 
banks among the 20 largest US banks, chosen on the basis of the S&P long term 
bond rating, and assume that a median bank among them holds the US high 
quality portfolio. Like Jackson et al (2002), we further assume that the portfolio 
consists of 500 bullet loans, each loan of equal size and with a three-year 
maturity. The loans are distributed over rating categories according to the shares 
of the US high quality portfolio. We apply a uniform 20% asset correlation ρ and 
assume a constant 45% LGD for all loans.
7 The S&P’s rating transition 
probability matrix is used in simulating rating transitions and defaults over the 
planning horizon as well as in obtaining one-year default probabilities to be used 
in the IRBA function. By so doing we assume that there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between the S&P’s ratings and the bank’s internal rating system. 
Following Jokivuolle and Peura (2004) the margin income multiplier θ (equation 
4) is set at 3. Figure 1 provides an illustration of the simulation procedure. 
 
                                                 
7 Jackson et al (2002) model recovery (1-LGD) stochastically using the beta distribution with 
mean 50% and standard deviation 25%. Thus our base case deviates from theirs in that our 45% 
LGD implies a somewhat higher mean recovery of 55%. Our choice of 45% LGD is the same as 
the Basel Committee’s choice for senior unsecured loans’ LGD under the Internal Ratings Based 
approach. Moreover, we perform sensitivity analysis of the calibrated α by varying the parameter 
assumptions of our base case; including the LGD assumption.  
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t I L and E , P −  are portfolio rating distribution (ie credit portfolio 
quality), economic capital corresponding to the bank’s minimum rating target and 
net credit portfolio loss, respectively, with t = 0, T denoting time and s = 1, …, S 
denoting simulated portfolio rating distribution scenario. Starting with a given 
initial portfolio rating distribution P0 in period 0, we simulate S = 10000 rating 
transition scenarios for the 500 bullet loans over period [0,T] (one year). In each 
simulated scenario s, the rating distribution 
s
T P  yields economic capital 
s
T E 




T I L − ) due to defaults and accrued margin 
income according to (2.4). Required initial capital is determined from (2.2) based 
on the sum of the economic capital and the net credit loss. 
 
 
As Gordy’s (2000) portfolio rating distribution dates from the late 1990’s,
8 we 
consider twenty largest US banks having A or AA rating in year 2000. Due to 
some missing observations in the Bankscope database we are left with eleven A 
rated banks and five AA rated banks. Not knowing the exact year of the portfolio 
data, and also to smooth for potential transitory variation in bank capital ratios, we 
take the average Tier 1 ratio of each sample bank over 1997–1999 (see figure 2).
9 
In the sub sample of the five AA banks, the median Tier 1 ratio is 9.2%. In the 
calibration, the value of α is found by matching the amount of capital implied by 
the 9.2% ratio with capital produced by our model for the US high quality 
portfolio. 
 
                                                 
8 The dates of the Fed survey on bank portfolios are not reported in Gordy (2000). 
9 Using data on capital ratios from the last boom years of the end of 1990’s fits well with the 
premise of the rating targeting framework that it is in the good times that banks have an 
opportunity to build precautionary capital buffers for the purpose of minimum rating maintenance.  
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Figure 2.  Average Tier 1 ratio over 1997–1999 of sixteen 
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      Banks are numbered in ascending order according to 
their average Tier 1 ratios. The median of the A and 
AA sub samples are taken, respectively, of the three-



















94,5 95,0 95,5 96,0 96,5 97,0 97,5 98,0 98,5 99,0 99,5 100,0 %
Base case Maturity 2 Maturity 4
Asset correlation 15% Asset correlation 25% LGD 35%
LGD 55%  
 
      In the base case the portfolio loan maturity used in 
economic capital calculation is three years, asset 
correlation is 20% and the realized LGD is 45%. The 
other curves depict variations to the base case such 
that only one parameter value is changed at a time. 
The alternative curves are named according to the 
varied parameter value. The horizontal curve depicts 
the 9.2% median Tier 1 ratio of the sample AA banks. 
 
 
Figure 3 provides an illustration of the calibration for the various parameter 
combinations. Each upward sloping curve in the figure depicts, for a given 
parameter combination, the amount of capital (y-axis) the VaR on VaR model 
requires to obtain a given rating targeting confidence level (x-axis). The 
intersection of a given curve and the horizontal line drawn at the 9.2% level, the 
Tier 1 ratio of the median AA bank, marks the calibrated value of α on the x-
axis.
10 
  For our base case parameter choices α of AA banks obtains (approximately) 
the value 99.60%. The other parameter combinations depicted in figure 3 provide 
a sensitivity analysis of the calibration, in which we vary portfolio maturity, 
realized LGD and the asset correlation around the base case values. In these 
alternative cases considered α ranges from approximately 96.25% to more than 
99.96%. 
                                                 
10 In practice, we have computed the capital buffer and the resulting capital ratio for a number of 
alternative values of α. We then complete the calibration by using linear interpolation to find the 
value of α which matches a given Tier 1 ratio.  
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  As our AA bank sample only consists of five banks we also look at the A 
rated banks. Their sample median Tier 1 ratio is 7.8% which is, as expected, 
somewhat lower than that of the AA banks’. It implies with our base case 
parameters an α value of (approximately) 98.23%. Given the assumption that the 
A rated banks typically hold a similar high quality portfolio as the AA rated 
banks, the lower α implies that these banks are willing to tolerate a somewhat 
higher probability of being downgraded below their current rating. 
  Moody’s rating transition data for banks, as reported in Nickell et al (2000), 
shows how often banks in actuality are downgraded below a certain threshold 
from a given initial rating. Acknowledging that there should be a high 
correspondence between S&P and Moody’s rating categories, the Moody’s data 
over 1970–1997 shows that an AA bank has a 0.3% probability in a year’s time to 
be downgraded below single A rating (Nickell et al, 2000, table 2). This implies 
an α equal to 99.7%.
11 Nickell et al (2000) also report model based estimates of 
bank rating transition probabilities, conditional on the state of the business cycle 
or the country of bank domicile, which imply values for α between 98.9% and 
99.6%.
12 By and large, these estimates of α are well in line with our base case 




Our work relates to the recent literature on whether regulatory capital 
requirements are the binding capital constraint on banks or whether banks’ own 
economic capital choice exceeds regulatory requirements. Peura and Jokivuolle 
(2004) study banks’ precautionary capital buffers on top of regulatory minimum 
capital requirements and argue that when the precautionary buffers are taken into 
account the resulting bank capital levels may well exceed banks’ economic 
capital. This is an alternative explanation to the one advocated in this paper that 
precautionary capital buffers are reserved on top of some minimum economic 
capital level, associated with a minimum rating target. One cannot directly 
discriminate which of the two constraints is the binding one because the two 
confidence levels for not breaching the respective constraints are unobservable. 
However, evidence in Jackson et al (2002) that bank rating downgrades do have a 
significant negative effect on banks’ trading volumes in the swap markets lends 
support to the rating targeting based explanation. This latter explanation is also 
                                                 
11 What should probably be taken into account in inferring α directly from the rating transition 
probabilities is the alleged autocorrelation of rating changes. That is, the probability that an A 
rated bank will be further downgraded, conditional on a downgrade from AA to A in the previous 
period, may be higher than the corresponding unconditional probability. 
12 These are based on cumulative transition probabilties over one year horizon for a downgrade 
from Moody’s Aa to Baa or below (Nickell et al, 2000, tables 6 and 8).  
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supported by the findings in this paper. US AA banks’ actual capital buffers imply 
a confidence level for maintaining at least an A rating, which is in line with an 
AA bank’s historical transition probability to a rating below A. 
  Further direct empirical evidence on banks’ rating targeting behaviour would 
also be helpful. Such evidence until now includes Kisgen (2005b) who shows that 
firms increase their capital market activity after rating downgrades. His analysis 
could be extended to a sample that only contains banks. Using his approach, it 
could be tested whether the A/BBB threshold is more important for banks in 
particular than the threshold between investment grade and speculative grade that 
he finds for firms in general. This could complement the evidence for the A rating 
as a minimum target, which is argued for by Jackson et al (2002) and which also 
gets support from the bank rating transition probabilities reported in Nickell et al 
(2000). 
  The ideas on modelling bank capital buffers, developed further in this paper, 
could also be used in the empirical measurement of actual buffer capital. Until 
now the evidence on banks’ capital buffers is somewhat mixed. For instance, 
Ayuso et al (2004), Lindquist (2004), Bikker and Metzemakers (2004) and Jokipii 
and Milne (2006) all report evidence that banks’ capital buffers move, if anything, 
counter-cyclically, ie they decrease in booms and increase in downturns. This 
seems to run counter to the precautionary buffer view which suggests that buffers 
should be built in good times to be then consumed in bad times when risks are 
materialised and external capital is hard to come by. However, in these papers the 
buffer is defined with respect to the Basel 1988 Accord minimum requirements 
which are not a good proxy for minimum economic capital. Therefore, the results 
of these studies may not really enable conclusions regarding banks’ capital 
management with a view on rating targeting. 
  By contrast, Flannery and Rangan (2002) who use market values of equity, 
show that since the 1990’s US banks’ higher capital levels have clearly become 
accompanied with the level of their risk-taking. Further empirical analysis which 
would explicitly consider the interaction between bank ratings, economic capital, 
and capital buffers, and would control for the time-varying through-the-cycle 
agency rating criteria (as studied by Altman and Rijken, 2004), would clearly be 
welcome. 
  The simulation procedure we have used in this paper could also be developed 
in a number of ways. The bank’s re-lending policy could be added to give a more 
realistic picture of the bank’s credit portfolio asset management (see Gordy and 
Howells, 2006, for an example). Secondly, taking account of rating agencies’ 
‘through-the-cycle’ rating methodology could be considered (see the discussions 
in eg Altman and Rijken, 2004, and Gordy and Howells, 2006). Essentially this 
rating methodology implies that a rating stays constant over an economic cycle if 
there is no change in the company’s financial position relative to other companies. 
An implication of through-the-cycle ratings is that a given rating implies a lower  
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probability of default in a cyclical peak than in a trough. Bangia et al (2002), and 
especially Nickell et al (2000) concerning banks, provide evidence of such state 
dependent default probabilities. By the same token it could be argued that in our 
model of rating targeting the minimum economic capital needed for the minimum 
rating should depend on the state of the business cycle. If the economy were in a 
boom (recession), more (less) economic capital would be required for a given 
rating. This could be incorporated in our simulation model by adopting eg the 
two-state Markov model for the evolution of the business cycle used by Peura and 
Jokivuolle (2004), which would be used with state dependent rating transition 




In this paper we have suggested a methodology for putting in practice a bank’s 
pursuance to maintain a minimum credit agency rating. A number of authors have 
argued that maintaining a sufficiently high rating, in practice single A, is crucial 
to a high-quality bank’s business operations such as functioning as active 
derivatives counterparty. We started with the simplifying assumption that a bank’s 
rating follows from the level of its capitalization relative to its risks, the latter 
measured by economic capital. In order to maintain a minimum rating a bank then 
has to maintain over its planning horizon enough equity to meet the economic 
capital needed for that minimum rating. We cast the rating targeting problem in an 
extended value-at-risk framework in which one value-at-risk calculation is nested 
in another. This structure can capture the dynamic economic capital constraint. 
The model can generate bank capital levels which are much higher than those 
obtained from standard single period economic capital models, and may hence 
explain the excess capital results reported in Jackson et al (2002). When calibrated 
to actual Tier 1 capital held by AA rated US banks, the model implied confidence 
level related to maintaining at least an A rating over time is broadly in line with 




Altman, E I – Rijken, H A (2004) How rating agencies achieve rating stability. 
J. Banking Finance 28, 2679–2714. 
 
Ayuso, J – Pérez, D – Saurina, J (2004) Are capital buffers pro-cyclical? 
Evidence from Spanish panel data. J. Financial Intermediation 13, 249–264. 
 
Bangia, A – Diebold, F – Kronimus, A – Schagen, C – Schuermann, T (2002) 
Ratings migration and the business cycle, with application to credit 
portfolio stress testing. J. Banking Finance 26, 445–474. 
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004) International convergence of 
capital measurement and capital standards: A revised framework. Bank 
for International Settlements, June. 
 
Bikker, J – Metzemakers, P (2004) Is bank capital procyclical? A cross-country 
analysis. De Nederlandsche Bank Working Paper 009/2004. 
 
Boot, A W A – Milbourn, T T – Schmeits, A (2006) Credit ratings as 
coordination mechanisms. R. Financial Studies 19, 81–118. 
 
Elizalde, A – Repullo, R (2004) Economic and regulatory capital: What is the 
difference? CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4770. 
 
Flannery, M J – Rangan, K P (2004) What caused the bank capital build-up of 
the 1990s? FDIC Center For Financial Research Working Paper No. 2004-03. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=681245. 
 
Gordy, M (2000) A comparative anatomy of credit risk models. J. Banking 
Finance 24, 119–149. 
 
Gordy, M (2003) A risk-factor model foundation for ratings-based bank 
capital rules. J. Financial Intermediation 12, 199–232. 
 
Gordy, M – Howells, B (2004) Procyclicality in Basel II: Can we treat the 




Gordy, M – Howells, B (2006) Procyclicality in Basel II: Can we treat the 
disease without killing the patient? Journal of Financial Intermediation 15, 
395–417. 
 
Jackson, P – Perraudin, W – Sapporta, V (2002) Regulatory and ‘economic’ 
solvency standards for internationally active banks. J. Banking Finance 
26, 953–976. 
 
Jokipii, T – Milne, A (2006) Cyclical Behaviour of European Bank Capital 
Buffers. Forthcoming in the Journal of Banking and Finance. 
 
Jokivuolle, E – Peura, S (2001) Regulatory capital volatility. Risk. May. 
 
Jokivuolle, E – Peura, S (2004) Stress tests of banks’ regulatory capital 
adequacy: Application to tier 1 capital. In: Ong, M (Ed.), The Basel 
handbook: A guide for financial practitioners. Riskbooks, 137–154. 
 
Morgan, J P (1997) CreditMetricsTM – Technical Document. Morgan, J P, 
New York. 
 
Kisgen, D J (2005a) Credit ratings and capital structure. J. Finance, 
forthcoming. 
 
Kisgen, D J (2005b) Do firms target credit ratings or leverage levels? 
Unpublished manuscript. Finance department at Boston College. 
 
Lindquist, K (2004) Banks’ buffer capital: How important is risk? 
J. International Money Finance 23, 493–513. 
 
Nickell, P – Perraudin, W – Varotto, S (2000) Stability of ratings transitions. 
J. Banking Finance 24, 203–227. 
 
Peura, S – Jokivuolle, E (2004) Simulation based stress tests of banks’ 
regulatory capital adequacy. J. Banking Finance 28, 1801–1824. 
 
Wilde, T (2001) IRB approach explained. Risk. May. 
 
  
BANK OF FINLAND RESEARCH 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
ISSN 0785-3572, print; ISSN 1456-6184, online 
 
1/2006  Juha-Pekka Niinimäki – Tuomas Takalo – Klaus Kultti  The role of comparing 
in financial markets with hidden information. 2006. 37 p. 
ISBN 952-462-256-4, print; ISBN 952-462-257-2, online. 
 
2/2006  Pierre Siklos – Martin Bohl  Policy words and policy deeds: the ECB and the 
euro. 2006. 44 p. ISBN 952-462-258-0, print; ISBN 952-462-259-9, online. 
 
3/2006  Iftekhar Hasan – Cristiano Zazzara  Pricing risky bank loans in the new 
Basel II environment. 2006. 46 p. ISBN 952-462-260-2, print; 
ISBN 952-462-261-0, online. 
 
4/2006  Juha Kilponen – Kai Leitemo  Robustness in monetary policymaking: a case 
for the Friedman rule. 2006. 19 p. ISBN 952-462-262-9, print; 
ISBN 952-462-263-7, online. 
 
5/2006  Juha Kilponen – Antti Ripatti  Labour and product market competition in a 
small open economy – Simulation results using the DGE model of the 
Finnish economy. 2006. 51 p. ISBN 952-462-264-5, print; 
ISBN 952-462-265-3, online. 
 
6/2006  Mikael Bask  Announcement effects on exchange rate movements: 
continuity as a selection criterion among the REE. 2006. 43 p. 
ISBN 952-462-270-X, print; ISBN 952-462-271-8, online. 
 
7/2006  Mikael Bask  Adaptive learning in an expectational difference equation 
with several lags: selecting among learnable REE. 2006. 33 p. 
ISBN 952-462-272-6, print; ISBN 952-462-273-4, online. 
 
8/2006  Mikael Bask  Exchange rate volatility without the contrivance of 
fundamentals and the failure of PPP. 2006. 17 p. ISBN 952-462-274-2, 
print; ISBN 952-462-275-0, online. 
 
9/2006  Mikael Bask – Tung Liu – Anna Widerberg  The stability of electricity prices: 
estimation and inference of the Lyapunov exponents. 2006. 19 p. 
ISBN 952-462 276-9, print; ISBN 952-462- 277-7, online. 
 
10/2006  Mikael Bask – Jarko Fidrmuc  Fundamentals and technical trading: 
behavior of exchange rates in the CEECs. 2006. 20 p. 
ISBN 952-462278-5, print; ISBN 952-462-279-3, online. 
  
 
11/2006  Markku Lanne – Timo Vesala  The effect of a transaction tax on exchange 
rate volatility. 2006. 20 p. ISBN 952-462-280-7, print; 
ISBN 952-462-281-5, online. 
 
12/2006  Juuso Vanhala  Labour taxation and shock propagation in a New Keynesian 
model with search frictions. 2006. 38 p. ISBN 952-462-282-3, print; 
ISBN 952-462-283-1, online. 
 
13/2006  Michal Kempa  Money market volatility – A simulation study. 2006. 36 p. 
ISBN 952-462-284-X, print; ISBN 952-462-285-8, online. 
 
14/2006  Jan Toporowski  Open market operations: beyond the new consensus. 2006. 
33 p. ISBN 952-462-286-6, print; ISBN 952-462-287-4, online. 
 
15/2006  Terhi Jokipii – Brian Lucey  Contagion and interdependence: measuring 
CEE banking sector co-movements. 2006. 42 p. ISBN 952-462-288-2, print; 
ISBN 952-462-289-0, online. 
 
16/2006  Elina Rainio  Osakeyhtiölain vaikutukset sijoittajan suojaan ja 
rahoitusmarkkinoiden kehitykseen. 2006. 52 p. ISBN 952-462-296-3, print; 
ISBN 952-462-297-1, online. 
 
17/2006  Terhi Jokipii – Alistair Milne  The cyclical behaviour of European bank 
capital buffers. 2006. 42 p. ISBN 952-462-298-X, print; ISBN 952-462-299-8, 
online. 
 
18/2006  Patrick M. Crowley – Douglas Maraun – David Mayes  How hard is the euro 
area core? An evaluation of growth cycles using wavelet analysis. 2006. 
42 p. ISBN 952-462-300-5, print; ISBN 952-462-301-3, online. 
 
19/2006  Yehning Chen – Iftekhar Hasan  Why do bank runs look like panic? A new 
explanation. 2006. 21 p. ISBN 952-462-302-1, print; ISBN 952-462-303-X, 
online. 
 
20/2006  Tuomas Välimäki  Why the marginal MRO rate exceeds the ECB policy 
rate? 2006. 36 p. ISBN 952-462-304-8, print; ISBN 952-462-305-6, online. 
 
21/2006  Heli Snellman – Matti Virén  ATM networks and cash usage. 2006. 28 p. 
ISBN 952-462-308-0, print; ISBN 952-462-309-9, online. 
 
22/2006 Terhi  Jokipii    Forecasting market crashes: further international evidence. 
2006. 39 p. ISBN 952-462-320-X, print; ISBN 952-462-321-8, online. 
  
23/2006 Asokan  Anandarajan – Iftekhar Hasan – Cornelia McCarthy  The use of loan 
loss provisions for capital management, earnings management and 
signalling by Australian banks. 2006. 49 p. ISBN 952-462-322-6, print; 
ISBN 952-462-323-4, online. 
 
24/2006  Bill B Francis – Iftekhar Hasan – Xian Sun  Financial market integration and 
the value of global diversification: evidence for US acquirers in cross-
border mergers and acquisitions. 2006. 35 p. ISBN 952-462-324-2, print; 
ISBN 952-462-325-0, online. 
 
25/2006  Federico Ravenna – Juha Seppälä  Monetary policy and rejections of the 
expectations hypothesis. 2006. 41 p. ISBN 952-462-326-9, print; 
ISBN 952-462-327-7, online. 
 
26/2006  Ville Mälkönen – Timo Vesala  The adverse selection problem in imperfectly 
competitive credit markets. 2006. 24 p. ISBN 952-462-328-5, print; 
ISBN 952-462-329-3, online. 
 
27/2006  Esa Jokivuolle – Samu Peura  Rating targeting and the confidence levels 
implicit in bank capital. 2006. 21 p. ISBN 978-952-462-332-2, print; 
ISBN 978-952-462-333-9, online. 
 
 
 
 Suomen Pankki
Bank of Finland
P.O.Box 160
FI-00101 HELSINKI
Finland